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Searle’s Theory of Social Reality and Some Social Reality1
Abstract
In this paper, I attempt to show that Searle’s theory of social reality is largely based on his 
observation of some essential features of democratic societies, and is not universally ap-
plicable as it claims to be. I argue that his notion of collective acceptance or agreement, 
which is fundamental to his general theory, does not explain why a dictatorial or totalitar-
ian regime as a social reality is able to survive through a significant period of time and 
continuously create and maintain institutional facts which are supposed to have no basis of 
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One	 can	 notice	 some	 commonality	 between	
Searle’s	 idea	of	 collective	 intentionality	 and	
Marx’s	 account	 of	 human	 nature	 (“the	 tota-





mind.”	More	 importantly,	 both	 agree	on	 the	
derivative	nature	of	individual	intentionality.	
However,	 whereas	 Marx	 is	 only	 concerned	
with	 the	 derivation	 of	 individual	 intentiona-
lity	from	a	particular	collective	intentionality,	
namely,	class	 intentionality	–	all	other	kinds	
of	 collective	 intentionality	 are	 merely	 dis-





of	 nations,	 of	 armies,	 of	 game	 teams,	 etc.,	
which	may	not	be	 reducible	 to	 intentions	of	
any	single	kind.	Searle	goes	so	far	as	to	assert	
that	collective	 intentionality	can	even	be	fo-










always	 the	same	as,	 the	collective	 intentionality.	Searle	gives	no	hint	as	 to	








and	 togetherness	presuppose	separateness,	and	 that	collective	 intentionality	
presupposes	 the	 pre-existence	 of	 individual	 intentionality	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
there	must	be	separate	individual	intentions	to	form	collective	intentionality.	
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criterion	of	“X	counts	as	Y	in	C”.	For	example,	the	debate	on	whether	“50 














must	 presuppose	 the	 independence	 of	 individuals	who	 intend	 to	make	 the	
agreement	and	the	agreement	must	be	made	by	separate	individuals,	and	not	
by	the	group	they	form.
The	 above	 argument	 for	 an	 initial	 individual	 intentionality	 as	 the	 pre-con-
dition	of	 the	 formation	of	collective	 intentionality	can	be	extended	 to	 sup-
port	the	thesis	that	individual	intentionality	is	also	a	persistent	and	continuing	
force	underlying	collective	intentionality.	The	birth	of	collective	intentional-
ity	 is	not	 followed	by	 the	death	of	non-derivative	 individual	 intentionality.	
The	 capacity	 of	 retrieving	 non-derivative	 individual	 intentionality	must	 be	


































bit	complex.	 It	may	appear	 that	 the	violinist	
who	plays	under	 the	baton	of	 the	 conductor	
has	only	 the	 role	of	obeying	 the	decision	of	
the	conductor	with	 regard	 to	how	 the	music	
is	performed.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 sense	 that	playing	
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collective	acceptance	or	agreement.	A	case	 in	point	 is	 the	 type	of	societies	





was	 no	 short	 of	 public	 support	 or	 lack	 of	 acceptance	 or	 agreement	 of	 the	
masses	for	the	rule	of	Nazism	or	Communism	at	least	at	their	early	stages.14
Now	the	question	is	not	whether	a	dictatorship	or	a	totalitarian	regime	nec-
essarily	 lacks	 any	democratic	 element	 understood	 as	 public	 support	 or	 the	




overwhelming	 cases	 in	which	 the	 alleged	 collective	 intentionality	 is	 really	
disguised	intentionality	of	the	dictators,	and	collective	acceptance	or	agree-















or	 totalitarian	 society,	 there	 still	 exists	 collective	 acceptance	 or	 agreement	
at	a	certain	level,	that	is,	at	the	level	of	those	in	power.	But	this	seems	con-
tradictory	to	Searle’s	view	that	collective	acceptance	or	agreement	requires	
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society	or	 the	dictator’s	 loyal	 followers	can	hardly	substitute	 the	collective	
acceptance	or	agreement	of	the	society	as	a	whole,	for	they	constitute	only	
a	very	small	fraction	of	 the	population	of	 the	given	society,	which,	not	 the	
members	of	the	ruling	party	or	the	dictator’s	loyal	followers,	is	the	relevant	
community.	In	other	words,	even	if	there	always	exist	collective	acceptance	
or	agreement	 in	such	societies,	 it	does	not	follow	that	 the	existence	of	any	
collective	 acceptance	 or	 agreement,	 even	 on	Searle’s	 account,	 is	 sufficient	
for	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	institutional	facts.	Susan	Babbitt	points	






























involves	 ostensibly	 negotiations,	 compromi-
ses	and	roughly	equal	distribution	of	decision	
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continuously	 create	 and	maintain	 institutional	 facts	which	 are	 supposed	 to	
have	no	basis	of	collective	acceptance	or	agreement?
Xiaoqiang Han
Searlova teorija socijalne stvarnosti i neke socijalne stvarnosti
Sažetak
U ovom članku pokušavam pokazati da je Searlova teorija socijalne stvarnosti uglavnom teme-
ljena na njegovom opažanju nekih bitnih značajki demokratskih društava te da nije univerzalno 
primjenjiva kao što tvrdi. Tvrdim da njegov pojam kolektivnog pristanka ili dogovora, kao te-
meljni pojam njegove teorije, ne objašnjava zašto diktatorski ili totalitarni režim kao socijalna 
stvarnost uspijeva preživjeti značajno dugo i kontinuirano stvarati i održavati institucionalne 
činjenice koje ne bi trebale imati nikakvog temelja u kolektivnom pristanku ili dogovoru.
Ključne riječi
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Xiaoqiang Han
Searles Theorie der sozialen Wirklichkeit und irgendeiner 
sozialen Wirklichkeit
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel versuche ich zu beleuchten, Searles Theorie der sozialen Wirklichkeit gründe 
hauptsächlich auf dessen Wahrnehmung etlicher wesentlicher Eigenschaften demokratischer 
Gesellschaften, und sei nicht – wie er behauptet – universell verwendungsfähig. Ich halte daran 
fest, sein Begriff der kollektiven Akzeptanz bzw. Übereinkunft – als Grundterminus seiner The-
orie – erläutere nicht, weswegen das diktatorische oder totalitäre Regime als soziale Wirklich-
keit maßgeblich lange zu bestehen und institutionelle Fakten kontinuierlich zu schaffen bzw. zu 






La théorie de la réalité sociale de Searle et une autre réalité sociale
Résumé
Dans le présent article, j’essaie de montrer que la théorie de la réalité sociale de Searle est 
fondée principalement sur sa perception de certaines caractéristiques essentielles des sociétés 
démocratiques et qu’elle n’est pas applicable de façon aussi universelle qu’il l’affirme. Je sou-
tiens que son concept de consentement ou d’accord collectif, élément fondamental de sa théorie, 
n’explique pas pourquoi le régime dictatorial ou totalitaire en tant qu’une réalité sociale par-
vient à survivre pendant une période aussi considérable ni comment il parvient à produire et à 
maintenir de façon prolongée et continue des faits institutionnels qui ne devraient avoir aucun 
fondement dans un consentement ou un accord collectif.
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